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Introduction  
The relationship between state repression and protest is one of the most perplexing in social 
mobilization theory. Why in some cases does state repression succeed in suppressing organized 
protest and social movements, while in other cases it only serves to fan the flames of protest? 
Through various studies, different scholars have proposed and empirically supported 
contradictory theories that the relationship between the two is either an “inverted U,” positively 
linear, inversely linear, or curvilinear with a sharp increase at the extremes.  
A recent comparison of all approaches produced inconclusive results. In fact one expert in the 
field is doubtful the relationship will ever be resolved. While this may ultimately be correct, we will 
at least increases the chances of success and overall understanding of the issue if we eliminate 
the shortcoming present in the majority of the studies thus far, the imprecise naming and 
categorizing of variables, namely the aggregation of repression. This paper will attempt to shed 
some light on the issues in three parts. First I present a brief review of existing curve theories. 
Second, I proceed with a discussion of excessive aggregation, the common limitation of most of 
the current approaches. Lastly, I describe a new paradigm that deconstructs repression into more 
manageable and more useful elements.  
Which Curve is Correct, if Any?  
There is no consensus with regards to plotting the interaction between these two forces using 
state repression (alternatively called negative sanctions) as the independent variable on the x-
axis and political protest (also measured as political violence, rebellion) as the dependent variable 
on the y-axis. One school of thought supports a negative linear relationship; as repression 
increases, political violence decreases, in other words, repression works. Based primarily on 
resource mobilization theory, collective action, of which political violence is a sub-set, is a function 
of excess time, money, energy, logistical support, organizational strength, opportunities and 
restrictions by the state. As repression increases, the opportunities decrease as constraints 
increase and resources in general are increasingly difficult to acquire and retain. As a result, 
collective action and political violence decrease.[1]  
One study, building on the rational-actor model of social movement theory in general, assumes 
protestors will also behave rationally when faced with state repression based upon their 
immediate material costs and benefits. When there is little state repression while peaceful 
avenues to effect change are available, there will be little incentive to risk political violence 
because the same rewards can be achieved through actions with little or no cost, or at least much 
lower cost than violence. Likewise, if there is a high degree of state repression, the cost of 
political violence is too great and holds little benefit. However, the proponents argue, if there is 
only a moderate level of repression, the likelihood of political violence is high because there is no 
peaceful alternative, and the cost of violence is not prohibitive.[2] Plotting the rational-actor model 
results in an “inverted U” shaped relationship, with the highest level of unrest and political 
violence in countries with only moderate state repression.  
In Why Men Rebel, Ted Gurr also supports the inverted U hypothesis, although for different 
reasons. Rather than protestors as rational actors, he builds upon the relative deprivation theory 
of mobilization, where those most likely to protest are not necessarily the poorest, or most 
deprived, but the ones with the largest gaps between expectations and realities.[3] The inverted 
“U theory” can also be considered the analogous to the “J-curve,” popularized by Ian Bremmer. In 
the J-curve hypothesis, states are placed along the x-axis in order of authoritarianism with 
completely closed police states, such as North Korea, at the very left; open advanced 
democracies, such as India at the right; and in the middle countries in transition such as Russia 
and South Africa.[4] Political stability—the lack of violent protest—is plotted on the y-axis. The 
result is a J-shaped curve, with police states experiencing a moderate amount of stability, states 
in transition experiencing the lowest level of stability, and fully open (least repressive) states with 
the greatest stability. If the elements of the J-curve are modified—measure the inverse of political 
stability—violent political protest, and the inverse of increasing openness—increasing repression, 
the result is the inverted U, albeit a little lopsided. In a sense, both curves measure the same 
phenomena using inverse parameters, but with the same general relationships.  
In contrast to the negatively linear, inverted U, and initially positive but ultimately negative 
relationships discussed above, Marwan Khawaja’s study of the West Bank was the first to support 
a generalized positive relationship, where increased repression simply encourages more political 
violence.[5] By measuring elements critical to both resource mobilization theory and relative 
deprivation, both of which would have predicted, ultimately a decrease in political violence at the 
extreme levels of repression, he found violence actually increased. However, this positive 
relationship is also in doubt, as Khawaja acknowledges, if one considers the levels of repression 
experienced as only moderate. If Israel’s actions were categorized as only moderate, then the 
increased levels of violence could be interpreted to support the inverted U theory. Although, even 
this must be caveated by the finding that very low level of arrests resulted in sharp increases in 
protests.[6]  
Another study, by Douglas Hibbs, concludes that repression and protest have both a positive and 
negative relationship by introducing time as a variable in the analysis. While trying to analyze 
Gurr’s relationship between deprivation (relative or absolute) and political violence, Hibbs 
discovered the outcomes varied as he altered the time-frame of the study. The result was an 
alternative repression-protest hypothesis where increased levels of state repression actually 
increased political violence in the short term, but in the long term increased repression actually 
reduces protests.[7] Lastly, Mason and Krane, found that while repression may serve to quiet 
protests, particularly harsh repression can incite protest.[8] This can either be interpreted as 
repression initially reduces protest, but over time increases protest (just the opposite finding to 
Hibbs’ positive, then negative relationships), or it can be used by some to support the inverted-U 
hypothesis, with a sharp rise at the very end. This has become known as the “backlash” 
hypothesis.  
In contrast to the majority of the empirical studies, completed by researchers testing specific 
theories, usually their own, Ronald Francisco's study represents analysis by a disinterested party. 
The work’s primary utility to the field, according to the author, is his successful application of the 
predator-prey model. However, in the process, he impartially tests the validity of several 
repression-protest curve theories on three case studies.[9] The results are inconclusive. While 
“the inverted-U hypothesis receives less support than its “backlash” alternative,” the backlash 
hypothesis is only “supported weakly” in one of the cases.[10] Additionally, statistically speaking, 
repression and protests were only “significantly interdependent” in one of the three cases, with 
the other two showing “little statistical significance in the interactive terms.”[11]  
With each scholar “successfully” proving a different curve that represents a particular hypothesis 
on the relationship between repression and mobilization, and “unbiased” scholars, who are more 
focused on analytical testing models, unable to determine the best curve, or even the statistical 
relevance of the relationship, there is clearly a lack of consensus and comprehensive delineation 
of the forces at work. Charles Tilly does not offer any optimism at the chances of resolving the 
confusion; “repression and mobilization regularly interact…but those interactions do not conform 
to covering laws.”[12] In fact he supports the idea that the interactions can be adequately 
explained at the level of individual events, but doubts that any new overarching theory will be 
developed to describe either multiple events or the grouping of like events.[13]  
Common Error  
One basic tenet of system dynamics modeling is that if one variable can both negatively or 
positively affect another, then it is not properly defined; there must be other intermediate variables 
that are at work and need to be addressed. This can easily lead to a model that is so complex 
and full of caveats that its utility is diminished. There needs to be a balance between on one hand, 
aggregated, generalized and simplistic models, and on the other, complex models that have little 
application beyond the studies they were built upon. One of the reasons the relationship between 
repression and protest is so muddied is that studies have erred too far on the aggregated, 
generalized and simplistic side. While all acknowledge the fact that there are more forces at play, 
few fully examine how including some of these additional elements might clarify the results.  
In the struggle for a theory with universal application, as an increasing number of these variables 
move from an integral part of the analysis to footnotes, the accuracy and relevance of the theory 
decreases. Mark Lichbach addresses one half of the aggregation issue, primarily focusing on 
inaccuracies of aggregating levels of protests in the face of repression.[14] Such techniques he 
warns do not fully account for the shifts between violent and non-violent protests, adoption 
methods in light of government responses, and learned repertoires of the protestors as they gain 
experience. Likewise, other researchers have voiced concerns over excessive aggregation with 
respect to the type of repression and coercion used against protestors. In Francisco’s predator-
pray study where three case studies were used to analyze multiple curve hypotheses, he admits 
“no single indicator of coercion can capture the full measure of its application to a population.”[15] 
Despite these recognized shortcomings, however, he relies solely on arrests, injuries and deaths 
in two cases, and deaths alone in the third case as his measures of coercion.[16] The more 
nuanced methods of state repression such as punishing protestors by taking away their children, 
burning down their houses, detention without trial, demotion to manual labor, restriction from job 
advancement, etc. are acknowledged to have taken place, but are not included in the analysis, 
instead they are relegated to footnote four.[17] How can we expect to accurately understand the 
mind, motivations, and influences on protestors when significant acts such as taking away their 
children or burning down their houses are ignored? While most researchers acknowledge the 
limitations of aggregation and generalization of repression and protest, few offer a framework for 
addressing the problem.  
A New Look at Repression  
As early as 1976 Snyder called for a more nuanced approach to repression addressing both 
violent and non-violent forms, and the timing of such actions.[18] When examining the impact of 
repression on protests, he argued, repression must be analyzed with these various criteria, rather 
than dealing with it at the aggregate. He did not, however, propose specific relationships between 
the type and timing of repression and its effect of protests.[19] Mohammed Hafez’s work Why 
Muslim’s Rebel answers Snyder’s call and provides a specific framework for the 
conceptualization and analysis of repression. Combining various frameworks from multiple 
scholars he devolves repression into two parts—lack of political access and physical repression—
and breaks down physical repression further into timing and targeting. He concludes that it is the 
combination of lack of political access and state repression methods that are both reactionary and 
indiscriminate that will result in the greatest increase in protest, to the point of rebellion.[20]  
Adopting the political process approach of Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam, Hafez takes the category of 
authoritarian state and breaks it into two separate components, political access and state 
repression which are not necessarily interconnected. States can independently chose to vary the 
level of political openness and the level of state repression, resulting in very repressive states that 
allow a specific level of participation in the process, and completely closed states that do not 
allow any participation in the political process. Goodwin has conducted detailed studies on the 
idea that the level of inclusiveness can be a determining factor in the success of revolutionary 
movements. He grades states on three levels: type of state organization (patrimonial/clientalistic 
to bureaucratic/rational), type of political regime (liberal/inclusive to repressive/exclusive) and 
infrastructural power (weak to strong).[21] He concludes that the states most vulnerable to 
political violence are exclusive/repressive regimes with patrimonial/clientalistic organization and 
weak infrastructural power.  
Hafez borrows and simplifies Goodwin’s findings, content to limit the analysis of state regimes to 
inclusive/exclusive spectrum. The effects of political inclusion are opposition groups are well 
documented. Hafez summaries that “the more accessible the system the more likely Islamist 
movements will adopt accommodative strategies and shun violence over time,” likewise, even a 
repressive authoritarian state that allows some degree of inclusion is “less likely to unify 
opponents behind a revolutionary strategy or witness internal wars.”[22]  
Previous studies attempted to measure the “level” of repression, or put a numerical value on the 
“harshness” which is inherently problematic. While most would agree that killing 1,000 people is 
harsh, and killing is harsher than arrests, one only has to try to determine the “harsher” state 
action between killing 1 person and arresting 1,000 to reach a “harshness” dilemma. Rather than 
harshness, Hafez adopts the concepts of other scholars and considers the timing and targeting of 
repression. With regards to timing, repression can be judged on a scale between preemptive or 
reactionary, while targeting varies between precise and indiscriminate.[23]  
Summarizing the previous works in these areas, he concludes that preemptive and precise 
repression by the state will likely succeed in reducing political violence, while reactive and 
indiscriminate repression will likely incite more political violence.[24] When combined with the 
analysis on political access, we can say that governments that allow no political access and 
practice reactive and indiscriminate repression are at an extreme risk for violent political protest 
and rebellion. Likewise, states that allow greater degree of political access can exert some 
degree of repression without fear of increased protests.  
Instead of tracing a curve along the x- and y-axis, as proposed in over-aggregated studies, this 
new approach can be visualized as a cube with degrees of timing, targeting, and political access 
as the variables, where one corner representing the dangerous nexus timing targeting and 
political access. (See Figure 1) This treatment of repression goes a long way to explaining why 
repression can sometimes lead to rebellion and in other cases quiets the masses; it also helps 
explain why various researchers have reached different conclusions when analyzing the problem 
in a more generalized and aggregated context.  
 
 
Figure 1:  
 
Conclusion  
The existing theories on the relationship between repression and political mobilization are equally 
contradictory and inadequate. Independent tests of the various theories proposed offer little clarity 
as the results are often inclusive. This paper proposes that the common problem shared by most 
of the previous work on the subject is the oversimplification, or aggregation, of the repression 
variable. While others have promoted a further refinement of the “political protest” side of the 
relationship, only Snyder proposed refinement of repression into multilevel elements. Hafez, 
building on previous works involving the political process model, political inclusion, repression 
timing and repression targeting, deconstructs the repression variable as it was used in previous 
studies into three elements. Using the elements of timing, targeting and access, we can more 
accurately predict violent reactions to repression in specific situations and start to resolve the 
seemingly contradictory results of previous studies that analyzed repression as a one 
dimensional variable.  
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